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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RULON R. WEST, 
Plaintiff and Appellant~ 
vs. 
TERRY R. WEST and FLORA E. 
WEST, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
9870 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This was an action brought by a partner against 
his two co-partners for dissolution and winding up of 
partnership affairs, an accounting by the managing 
partner, and distribution of partnership property re-
maining after the payment of partnership liabilities. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Neither of the respondent partners objected to 
dissolution of the partnership. The lower court, on 
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appellant's motion and over respondents' objections, 
appointed a receiver to take possession of partnership 
assets, manage them pending sale, sell them, and wind 
up partnership affairs. Partnership assets (primarily 
a motel, trailer park and trailer sales office) were sold, 
whereafter the court appointed a special master to take 
evidence with respect to the accounting to be rendered 
by respondent Terry R. West. The court made some 
adjustments as to amounts due from the partners to 
each other and entered a judgment (on the basis of an 
interlocutory summary judgment entered at an earlier 
stage of the case) that all funds of the partnership after 
payment of creditors other than partners, and deduction 
of the costs and fees of the receivership were to be paid 
"4oro to Rulon West, 40ro to Terry West and 20% 
to Flora E. West." In other words, the court ruled that 
appellant was not entitled to return of amounts he had 
contributed to partnership capital, nor to amounts he 
had loaned to the partnership during operation of the 
motels, regardless of the disparity between his payments 
and respondents' payments. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of that part of the judg-
ment establishing amounts to be distributed to the part-
ners, and entry of a decree that the receiver pay all 
liabilities to partners, including capital contributions 
and loans before making distribution to the parties in 
the proportions shown; also that the plaintiff Rulon 
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R. West be paid interest as provided in the partnership 
articles. 
In event the court does not enter a decree as re-
quested, then appellant seeks remand to the District 
Court for trial of fact issues bearing upon interpreta-
tion of the articles of partnership, and dissolution agree-
ments, and whether amounts paid into the partnership 
by appellant were capital contributions, or loans, or 
gifts. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The primary dispute has been over the extent to 
which the partners are entitled to participate in dis-
tribution upon winding up of partnership affairs. In-
asmuch as the lower court did not try the issue but 
granted a summary judgment with respect to the dis-
tribution, it must have concluded that there were no 
material facts in dispute. This statement of facts, there-
fore, will refer severally to the pleadings, to undisputed 
facts, and to facts lying within an area of dispute. 
[References to pages of the official record will be 
prefaced by "R", and those to depositions by the name 
of the deponent. Because of the identity of family name, 
the appellant will sometimes be called "Rulon," the 
respondents "Terry," and "Flora."] 
The Pleadings 
The complaint (R. 1-10) was in three counts. The 
first alleged a dispute as to the meaning of the partner-
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ship articles with respect to distribution upon winding 
up of the partnership, and asked for a declaratory 
judgment; the second alleged dissolution of the part-
nership by appellant and a refusal by Terry West to 
wind up partnership affairs; the third alleged disagree-
ment between appellant and Terry, a disregard by 
Terry of the appellant's requests, instances of Terry's 
improper management, and his failure to render an 
accounting, the prayer being for a decree of dissolu-
tion and court assistance in winding up partnership 
affairs. 
In his answer (R. 11-13) Terry admitted the part-
nership agreement and that he claimed to be entitled 
to 40 per cent of all partnership assets, including con-
tributions and advances made at any time by the appel-
lant; he denied there had been a dissolution by appellant 
and alleged that on April 2, 1960, the parties had 
entered into a written dissolution agreement [appar-
ently signed by appellant on March 31], annexed to 
his answer as Exhibit 2 ( R. 19-22) ; he admitted that 
appellant had paid approximately $148,000.00 into 
the· partnership by way of either contributions or loans 
but alleged that all of the money paid in by the plaintiff 
was "capital contribution." As an affirmative defense 
Terry repleaded the dissolution agreement of April 
2, 1960, as well as an agreement supplemental to it 
(R. 18) from which he concluded that the appellant 
by those "and other written instruments" had "trans-
ferred and reaffirmed transfer to defendant, and de-
fendant accepted same, relied upon same, and mate· 
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rially altered and changed his entire plans and future 
plans, and changed his position, and accepted said 
transfer." Terry also alleged that on or about April 2, 
1960, by the supplemental agreement, appellant had 
transferred 40 per cent of his interest to Terry, and 
that because of this Terry had entered into the dissolu-
tion agreement. By a counterclaim and amended coun-
terclaim (R. 173-17, 23-27) Terry sought 40 per cent 
of appellant's capital investment and all advances made 
by the appellant, as well as relief in connection with 
a separate transaction. 
In her answer ( R. 28-30) Flora claimed 20 per 
cent of all appellant's contributions to the partnership 
"whether at its inception or thereafter and whether 
by the way of capital contributions or by way of ad-
vances to the partnership" and that appellant "is not 
entitled to any return of contributions or advances;" 
she also alleged execution of the dissolution agreement 
dated March 31, 1960 (R. 19-22) and that the agree-
ment had been "ratified, approved and confirmed by" 
her; she admitted that Rulon contributed substantially 
all of the initial capital of the partnership. In her 
second defense Flora took the position that by the 
partnership agreement dated October 15, 1957, she 
received a 20 per cent interest in "all of the partnership 
property howsoever the same was received by the part-
nership, including capital contributions, whether made 
at the inception of said partnership or thereafter, and 
the undivided profits and income therefrom, and plain-
tiff by said contract of partnership is estopped to deny 
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or claim otherwise." In her third defense she stated that 
on October 15, 1957, the date of the original articles 
of partnership, appellant had made a gift to her of 
20 per cent of all the contributions made to the partner-
ship by him. She stated that in reliance on it she had 
materially altered her position, but she did not say how. 
In a fourth defense she stated that the instrument in 
writing dated on or about the 31st day of March, 1960, 
and the one dated the 2nd day of April, 1960 (R. 19-
22, 18), served to confirm, ratify, and approve the 20 
per cent interest given by the original partnership agree-
ment. Respondent Flora did not contend that either the 
agreement of April 2, 1960, or the supplement to it, 
itself operated as a gift in her favor. 
Undisputed Facts 
Prior to September, 1957, Rulon R. West, appel-
lant here, occasionally had expressed interest in pur-
chasing a motel. About that time his son, Terry, saw 
an advertisement for the sale of the El Rancho Motel 
in Murray and reported it to Rulon (Terry 3; Rulon 
7). Thereafter, at Rulon's request, Terry made an 
offer to purchase the motel, which was accepted (Terry 
4). 
A contract was entered into which Rulon and Terry 
were purchasers, and a down payment of $47,500.00 
was made by Rulon (Terry 5-6) . On about October 
15, Rulon, Terry and Flora executed "Articles of 
Partnership" under which they began to operate the 
motel. The interest in the real estate was contributed 
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to the capital of the partnership. A copy of the partner-
ship agreement is annexed to the complaint as Exhibit 
"A" (R. 6-10), and to this brief as Appendix "A". 
The motel business was operated by the partner-
ship as such until about March 21, 1960, when Rulon's 
attorneys sent a letter (R. 5) to Terry announcing his 
withdrawal and requesting Terry to wind up the part-
nership and distribute ::1.ssets. 
The partners negotiated toward a dissolution 
agreement. On March 31, 1960, Rulon executed the 
dissolution agreement and it was executed within a 
day or two thereafter by Terry (R. 12, par. 4). The 
agreement was not executed by Flora until sometime 
in January, 1961-after the present legal action had 
been initiated (Flora 20). The agreement is at R. 19-
22, is an exhibit to Rulon R. West's deposition, and 
is Appendix "B" to this brief. 
At about the time the dissolution agreement was 
signed by Terry (just before, according to his answer, 
R. 12, par. 3) Terry's attorney presented to Rulon 
what purported to be a supplemental agreement, dated 
April 2, 1960, the main purport of which was that 
"with respect to the 407o interest" acquired by Terry 
West, and the interest acquired by Flora West (what-
ever those interests were) it was agreed that they had 
been acquired by gift and that Rulon would file a gift 
tax return and absorb any losses. A copy of the "sup-
plemental agreement" is annexed to Terry's answer 
(R. 18) and is Appendix "C" to this brief. 
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Although the dissolution agree1nent and its sup-
plement had been executed by Terry and Rulon by 
April 2, 1960, partnership affairs were not wound up 
and on January 6, 1961, the complaint was filed in this 
action. 
Facts Which May be in Dispute 
After the action was initiated interrogatories and 
depositions were used by all parties. There are con-
flicting stories as to what the partners had in mind 
when certain funds were advanced to the partnership 
by Rulon, as well as to the circumstances under which 
the dissolution agreement and supplemental agreement 
were signed. 
Some of the facts set out in this subdivision may 
not be "disputed" in the usual sense, the versions related 
by the respective parties being consistent in many re-
spects. But the coloration is different and the possible 
impression upon a fact-finder (had the trial court per-
mitted a fact-finder to hear the evidence) is important 
in connection with this appeal. The lower court's judg-
ment nominally was based upon the prior discovery as 
well as the pleadings (R. 107, 110). 
Terry, who had been through business management 
school and graduated in accounting, drew the agree-
ment, according to Rulon, though Rulon suggested 
that it might be polished up by an attorney (Rulon 10). 
The division of profit and loss was changed from 50-50 
to 40-40-20 to permit Flora to participate (Terry 7). 
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Flora didn't know she was going to be a partner until 
the parties met to sign the agreement (Flora 9) , and 
neither did Rulon (Rulon 11). Terry says he under-
stood the capital of the partnership was to be distributed 
40-40-20 on distribution no matter who contributed 
or in what proportions (R. 7-8). But Flora at times 
says "gifts" of percentages made by Rulon were not 
made until Rulon signed the supplemental agreement 
in Murray on April 2, 1960 (R. 13). 
There are a number of activities o£ Terry and Flora 
which, to a fact-finder, would have significant bearing 
on construction of the original articles of partnership. 
For example, notwithstanding Terry's claimed "under-
standing" that all of the capital from whatever source 
would be distributed 40-40-20, accountant Terry main-
tained separate capital accounts, and amounts contribut-
ed and loaned by Rulon were credited to Rulon's capital 
(Terry 8) ; they remained so credited until after Rulon 
gave notice of dissolution. On June 15, 1960, Terry 
made a charge against Rulon's capital account and 
transferred 60 per cent of his capital credit to Terry 
and Flora, the amounts being approximately $30,000.00 
to Flora and $59,000.00 to Terry (R. 51, No. 5; R. 54, 
58, No. 5). This was done, according to Terry, on the 
basis of the dissolution agreement (Appendix "B"). 
Neither Terry nor Flora contributed to the begin-
ning capital (Terry 12, R. 6, par. 3) but after the 
partnership was in operation Terry "contributed" part 
of his salary (ex parte) by taking credits to his capital 
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account (Terry 12). After the partnership began Rulon 
"loaned" to the partnership (Rulon 12) approximately 
$100,000.00, which Terry says was "invested" Terry 
19). When money was needed Terry would ask Rulon 
for it; Terry and Flora gave Rulon an "opportunity 
of additional investment" by "not hollering when he 
put the money in" (Terry 20). When Rulon received 
this opportunity and took advantage of it he was given 
a credit to his capital account (Terry 20), but it was 
Terry's understanding that each time he obtained money 
from Rulon 40 per cent was to be his (Terry 21). The 
provision in the articles requiring the partners to con-
sent to increased contributions to capital was for the 
"protection" of the three partners (Terry 22) , but 
Rulon was to receive credit for his contributions or 
loans only as long as the business was opera ted ( R. 23), 
and Terry at one time interpreted the agreement as 
requiring him to repay Rulon in event of loss (Terry 
28). Terry also testified that he construed the partner-
ship contract as an agreement by Rulon to make a gift; 
and that he would not have to repay Rulon for losses, 
but that he and Flora would join in bearing the loss 
of what Rulon had given them (Terry 28). 
Accountant Terry kept all the partnership books 
(Terry 23) but no entry was ever made in any of them 
showing that Terry and Flora were to get part of 
Rulon's money until late spring of 1960, after notice 
of dissolution (Terry 33). 
The letter of March 21, 1960, in which Rulon stated 
10 
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that he was withdrawing was "the second time other 
than the-or the first time other than the original part-
nership he showed an indication of expecting only a 
40 per cent return of capital" (Terry 38). Between the 
signing of the partnership articles and the date of the 
letter Rulon had done nothing to indicate that he ex-
pected to get back only 40 per cent (Terry 38) . More-
over, Terry didn't regard any "gift" as having been 
made in the original partnership agreement, but only 
as having been "promised" (Terry 40) . After the part-
nership agreement had been entered into Terry had 
given financial statements relating to his own affairs 
but they did not show any interest in Rulon's capital 
account (Terry 41). 
Sometimes when Rulon advanced money he said he 
was "investing," according to Terry, and sometimes 
he didn't say anything, but just made the money avail-
able when requested. Terry had no letters from Rulon 
indicating that he was "investing" (Terry 50) . Rulon 
did show the contributions or loans as his asset (R. 51). 
During the time he was operating the partnership and 
keeping its books Terry did not furnish any partner-
ship returns and there was no division of profits (Terry 
52). 
Flora didn't know much about the partnership, 
how it was operated, or how it came into existence. She 
took the view that her 20 per cent was given to her at 
Murray by the supplemental agreement of April 2, 
1960, not by the partnership articles (Flora 13). More-
ll 
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over, she understood that tied to the "gift" was the 
proposition that Terry was to buy the interest of Rulon 
in the partnership, and that all papers were signed 
except for the paper indicating how Terry would pay 
for Rulon's interest (Flora 13). The only thing Flora 
had ever been concerned about was profit and loss, be-
cause she didn't think the business would be sold. She 
might have to dig up some money to meet the losses 
(Flora 14-15). She also understood that she was to 
get part of the assets, but the understanding about her 
receiving 20 per cent of Rulon's capital came solely 
from the partnership agreement, since the parties hadn't 
discussed the matter (Flora 17). [The inconsistency 
is Flora's not ours]. There were no meetings at which 
the partners agreed that additional investments might 
be made by Rulon (Flora 17-18). 
Flora did make "loans" to the partnership (Flora 
21) for which Terry gave her notes. But the notes 
were destroyed by her or Terry after they were paid 
off. She was not requested to "invest" in the partner-
ship (Flora 21). Rulon didn't examine the books, ac-
cording to her, and he never told her that she and Terry 
were to have 60 per cent of his payments into the part-
nership. When Terry came to him for additional 
moneys, it was Rulon's understanding and Terry's too, 
that notes were to be delivered. He discussed this with 
Terry many times and kept copies of correspondence 
relating to notes; moreover, he has witnesses to prove 
it. The notes were to bear interest at 5 per cent, a matter 
which was talked about on numerous occasions (Rulon 
12 
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12-13) . But he never did receive any interest. Rulon 
had requested on numerous occasions that the notes be 
executed and delivered to him (Rulon 25-27) . 
Terry's receiving part of Rulon's investment (or 
loans) to the partnership as an advancement of his 
"inheritance" was first discussed in Murray with Mr. 
E. L. Schoenhals (Terry's lawyer) a few hours before 
Rulon was to leave for South America on a trip (Rulon 
31). Rulon signed the dissolution agreement (Rulon 
34). The supplemental agreement of April 2, 1960, 
was "sprung on" Rulon at Murray just at the time 
the dissolution agreement was signed (Rulon 34). Rulon 
was surprised by the supplemental agreement because 
it had never been discussed (Rulon 36). Terry's attor-
ney at that time worked upon Rulon's passion and 
pressure for time, talking to him about inheritance and 
taxes when he was in a great hurry to leave (Rulon 
37-38) . Moreover, part of the understanding was that 
Rulon would get 6 per cent interest on all the money 
he left in the partnership. The luncheon meeting was 
the first time Rulon saw the supplemental agreement, 
and he neither received nor was promised anything for 
it (Rulon 62). 
Accountant Terry's keeping of partnership books 
was slipshod with respect to things other than Rulon's 
capital. He purchased a car in the company name which 
was a "contribution" to capital (Terry 12, 18), but it 
was his car because he made the down payment (Terry 
18), and was the company's car for income tax pur-
13 
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poses (Terry 18), and if the partners decided to go 
strictly by the partnership articles, probably the car 
would be a company car (Terry 32) . 
Although Terry treated Rulon's advances to the 
partnership as contributions to capital in which he and 
Flora were to share, he "borrowed" money from Flora 
on at least four different occasions (R. 47), and then 
paid the money back to her out of partnership funds 
with 8 per cent interest. 
On about June 15, 1960, Terry gave to Flora, 
out of Rulon's capital account, a credit of $30,000.00, 
which is shown in his answer to interrogatories as "re-
cording transaction between R. R. West and Terry 
R. West made in April, 1960" ( R. 54) . At the same 
time Terry took credit on his own capital account in 
the amount of $59,000.00. 
Rulon has shown the El Rancho as one of his 
assets in financial statements furnished by him (R. 61, 
66, No. 1 (b) ) . He didn't know Terry was borrowing 
money from Flora (R. 72, No. 31). 
All of the above matters were In record at the 
time the appellant moved for summary judgment on 
May 23, 1961). The trial court not only denied the 
plaint~ff's motion for summary judgment but took the 
position that there were no material facts that could 
lead to the construction contended for by appellant. It 
held the defendants entitled to judgment· as a matter 
of law that they receive 60 per cent of all amounts 
14 
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that had been paid into the partnership, whether by 
way of contribution or loan, by appellant. It is not 
clear whether the court was relying upon the partner-
ship itself (Appendix "A") or upon the dissolution 
agreement and supplement to it signed by two of the 
partners on about April 2, 1960 (Appendixes "B" and 
"C"). At the hearing on the motion for summary judg-
ment (R. 96) appellant objected to the introduction 
of evidence and resisted an attempt by the trial judge 
to have appellant proceed forthwith to trial for the 
purpose of determining the disputed questions of fact 
(R. 99). Appellant pointed out to the court the material 
issues of fact which needed to be tried (R. 89-102). 
When the defendants purported to rely on the agree-
ment of April 2, 1960, the appellant offered to show 
Terry's undue influence in obtaining it (R. 97). It 
was pointed out to the court (R. 98-100) that the appel-
lant's position would be that the "additional amounts 
that were paid by Rulon R. West to Terry R. West 
were not and never intended to be contributions to 
capital, that they were loans to the partnership, and 
that the evidence in the case of a trial of this thing 
would so show." It was also pointed out that one of the 
agreements of Terry West in consideration of the sup-
plemental agreement was that Terry would buy out 
Rulon's interest. in the partnership, which he never 
did do. 
When the appellant refused to enter into a court-
suggested settlement with respondents, the court en-
tered an order that the assets of the partnership would 
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be divided 40 per cent to Rulon, 40 per cent to Terry 
"by way of a gift" and 20 per cent to Flora "by way 
of a gift" after payment of liabilities to outsiders. This 
applied to all advancements to the partnership by Rulon 
whether contributions to capital or loans (R. 105-106). 
On June 29, 1962, the court appointed a special 
master to hear evidence concerning partnership ac-
counts. At that time the court withheld from considera-
ation by the master the amounts that had been standing 
in the capital accounts of the partners and the interest 
thereon. Thereafter, on January 7, 1963, the special 
master filed his report and, consistent with the court's 
discretion, did not make any allowance for interest to 
the partners on the amounts standing in their capital 
accounts despite an express provision in paragraph 4 
of the articles. An objection was raised to the master's 
report on this ground, among others (R. 165-166), but 
the objections were overruled and a final judgment 
was entered by the court on February 27, 1963, direct-
ing that all assets of the partnership - non-partner 
creditors having been paid-would be paid 407o to 
Rulon, 40Cfo to Terry, and 20ro to Flora. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
The court erred in directing that the assets of the 
partnership be distributed 40 per cent to appellant and 
60 per cent to respondents without prior repayment of 
loans and capital contributions of the partners. 
The decision can find justification only in some 
agreement between the parties; and the only agreements 
upon which any reliance has been placed by respondents 
were the partnership articles, the April 2, 1960, disso-
lution agreement, and the agreement supplementing it. 
There is no help for respondents in the statutes. 
(a) Under the Utah Partnership A.ct liabilities to 
partners are to be paid prior to distribution~ in the 
absence of an agreement to the contrary. 
The Utah Partnership Act in at least two sections 
recognizes the right of obligee-partners to be paid prior 
to distribution. The first, 48-1-15 Utah Code Annotated 
1953, provides: 
"The rights and duties of the partners in rela-
tion to the partnership shall be determined, sub-
ject to any agreement between them, by the 
following rules: 
(I) Each partner shall be repaid his contri-
butions, whether by way of capital or advances 
to the partnership, and share equally in the 
profits and surplus remaining after all liabilities, 
including those to partners, are satisfied; and 
must contribute towards the losses, whether of 
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capital or otherwise, sustained by the partner-
ship according to his share in the profits. * * * 
( 3) A partner who in the aid of the partner-
ship makes any payment or advance beyond the 
amount of capital which he agreed to contribute 
shall be paid interest from the date of the pay-
ment or advance. * * *" 
Related provisions in 48-1-37 Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, govern distribution of assets upon dissolu-
tion: 
"In settling accounts between the partners 
after dissolution the following rules shall be 
observed, subject to any agreement to the con-
trary: 
( 1) The assets of the partnership are: 
(a) Partnership property. 
(b) The contributions of the partners neces-
sary for the payment of all the liabilities specified 
in subdivision ( 2) of this section. 
( 2) The liabilities of the partnership shall 
rank in order of payment, as follows: 
(a) Those owing to creditors other than part-
ners. 
(b) Those owing to partners other than for 
capital and profit. 
(c) Those owing to partners in respect of 
capital. 
( 3) The assets shall be applied in the order 
of their declaration in subsection ( 1) of this sec-
tion to the satisfaction of the liabilities." 
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Under the statute itself appellant is clearly en-
titled to the return of his capital and, indeed, to recoup-
ment of his losses. The taking away of his rights, there-
fore, must be found in one of the three agreements 
appended to this brief; and the agreements do not lend 
themselves reasonably to the trial court's interpretation. 
(b) The partnership articles do not contain any 
agreement that liabilities to partners are not to be paid 
prior to distribution. 
It is impossible to determine whether the summary 
judgment was based upon the articles or the subsequent 
agreements. None of them contains an agreement show-
ing an intention to wind up differently than provided 
in the statute. 
The partnership articles contain two provisions 
which, read together, refer to distribution of assets after 
winding-up: 
"6. The net profits of the business shall be 
divided between the partners in the following 
proportions: Rulon R. West, forty per cent 
( 407o); Terry R. West forty per cent ( 407o) 
and Flora E. West twenty per cent ( 207o) .; and 
the partners shall in like proportion bear all losses 
including loss of capital. 
12. * * * If the partnership shall be deter-
mined or expire during the joint lives of the 
partners, then the partnership shall be wound up~ 
and the assets distributed in the proportions set 
forth in paragraph 6 above hereof." (Emphasis 
added.) 
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The word "assets" is not defined in the articles 
of partnership. Moreover, it could not have been used 
in the same sense as in the Partnership Act, which de-
fines assets to include ( 1) partnership property, and 
( 2) contributions of the partners necessary for the pay-
ment of all partnership liabilities (including liabilities 
to partners). If this definition were applicable to the 
term as used in the articles, distribution would be con-
templated even before non-partner creditors were paid. 
The trial court, in effect, construed "assets" to mean 
capital remaining after payment of non-partner lia-
bilities, as if "assets" and "capital" were synonymous. 
But the agreement itself did not treat the terms as 
equivalents. Paragraph 3, referring to capital, calls it 
"capital," not "assets." Paragraph 11 refers to the share 
of a deceased partner "in the capital and assets" -two 
different things. The above usages are co~sistent with 
the construction that assets means net assets, i.e., the 
surplus remaining after payment of partnership lia-
bilities. 
Supporting the conclusions based upon choice of 
words are contract provisions. completely inconsistent 
with the trial court's interpretation: 
Paragraph 3 (b) in defining the capital excludes 
sums paid in by partners for "non-capital purposes." 
Capital is to consist of beginning capital and sums any 
partners "shall with the consent of the others from time 
to time contribute for capital purposes," which are to 
be "credited to his capital accounts." Maintenance of 
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capital accounts would seem to indicate that they are 
to serve a purpose with respect to the "ownership" in-
terests of the partners. Why maintain capital accounts 
if the partners are to share 40-40-20 regardless of credits 
to those capital accounts 1 
Paragraph 4 provides that interest shall be paid 
on amounts in the capital account of each partner, that 
it shall accumulate, and that if it is not paid in one year 
it shall be made up out of gross profits of succeeding 
years. As construed by the trial court the interest is 
cumulative only if the obligee-partner manages to get 
his hands on it before dissolution-because the partners 
are entitled to assets 40-40-20, and anything that hap-
pens to be remaining in the partnership at dissolution 
is an "asset." 
Under paragraph 6 the partners are to "bear all 
losses, including loss of capital," in the proportions in 
which they share profits. But as interpreted by the trial 
court, losses of capital are to be borne by the partner 
who contributed the capital, in this case appellant. 
Accounting provisions in paragraph 8 were ignored 
by the trial court. That paragraph requires an account 
to be taken annually, at which time there is to be a 
"recouping of any loss of capital," and after adjust-
ments for depreciation and recouping, the net profits 
may be divided. A contributing partner is entitled to 
an adjustment, and if there has been a loss of capita] 
the profits are to be used to pay that partner. But the 
trial court would require this adjustment only if made 
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before dissolution, and any partner could prevent thr 
payment by dissolving the partnership at a propitious 
moment, the partnership "assets" then being bundled 
up and distributed in the proportions set out in para-
graph 6 without regard to any recoupment of loss of 
capital. 
Paragraph 11 prescribes a method for surviVmg 
partners to purchase the interest of a deceased partner. 
A formula is set out under which the purchase price is 
the amount "at which such share [of the deceased part-
ner] shall stand in the last balance sheet which shall 
have been prepared prior to the death of said partner 
plus ten per cent (107o) thereof." (Emphasis added). 
The "balance sheet" is described in paragraph 8, and 
is supposed to make allowance for depreciation and 
the recouping of lost capital. Paragraph 11 then re-
quires the surviving partners to pay as the base price 
for the deceased partner's interest an amount generally 
equivalent to the credit to his capital account. Interest 
and 107o is to be added to the base price .. 
If Rulon had died, and Flora and Terry had elected 
to purchase his interest, there would have been an obli-
gation to pay the amount that should be standing to the 
credit of Rulon's capital account, plus ten per cent, 
plus interest on the above. lTnder paragraph 12, how-
ever, if the deceased partner's interest is not purchased 
by the surviving partners pursuant to paragraph 11, 
"then the partnership shall be wound up, and the assets 
distributed in the proportions set forth in paragraph 
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6 above hereof." Under the interpretation adopted by 
the trial court, Flora and Terry as surviving partners 
could either: (1) purchase Rulon's interest; or (2) get 
60c;'o of it for nothing. For under the trial court's "every-
thing is asset" theory, all property in the partnership 
at the date of death would be distributed to the partners 
40-40-20 regardless of the state of capital accounts, 
loans, or contributions. The virtue of simplicity cannot 
overcome the sin of incongruity, and application of the 
trial court's theory would render paragraph 11 silly 
and meaningless. 
Admittedly, none of the partners had died, as antici-
pated in paragraph 11, but under the provisions 
of paragraph 12, the partnership is to be wound up 
and distributed in exactly the same way whether ( 1) 
a partner dies and the option to purchase is not exer-
cised, or ( 2) the partnership "shall be determined or 
expire during the joint lives of the partners." 
Paragraph 12 contains a provision that the partner-
ship shall be "wound up" and the assets distributed. 
Use of the term "wound up" implies an intention that 
things will be done that are inherent in the winding 
up process. These include payment of obligations, not 
only to non-partner creditors but to partners. Duncan 
v. Bartle et al.~ 188 Ore. 451, 216 P.2d 1005 (1950), 
was an action for dissolution of partnership and adjudi~ 
cation of accounts. The main issues of the case revolved 
about questions of date of dissolution and proper book-
keeping, but the court had this to say about termination, 
dissolution and winding up: 
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"A dissolution of a partnership must precede 
its termination. The order of events is ( 1) dis-
solution, ( 2) winding up, and ( 3) termination. 
A dissolution may be brought about by a partner 
for any of the causes recited in [the Oregon 
Partnership Act], or by a decree of the court 
***.Dissolution does not terminate the partner-
ship * * * and does not end completely the 
authority of the partners. Termination extin-
guishes their authority. It is the ultimate of the 
winding up and occurs at the conclusion of the 
wind up. Dissolution according to [Oregon Part-
nership Act] leaves the partners with authority 
'so far as may be necessary to wind up partner-
ship affairs or to complete transactions begun 
but not finished * * *' 
"Winding up, of course, means the termina-
tion of the assets for the purpose of terminating 
the business and discharging the obligations of 
the partnership to its creditors and members.}} 
(Emphasis added.) 
Paragraph 15 deals generally with winding up. 
Upon termination of the partnership there is to be a 
final accounting of all things relating to the business 
and an adjustment of accounts~ whereafter "all stock, 
as well as the gains and increases thereof, including 
all real and personal property, which shall appear to be 
remaining, either in money, goods, wares, fixtures, debts 
or otherwise shall be divided between them in the pro-
portions set forth" in paragraph 6. Paragraph 15 had 
no meaning for the trial court; it looked at "assets" as 
those things which happen to be in the partnership at 
the time of dissolution, without regard to adjustments, 
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loans, undistributed income, interest, losses, or credits 
or debits to any capital accounts. (It did permit some 
of the assets to be used to pay non-partner creditors 
before making the 40-40-20 split; otherwise "winding-
up" meant "distributing".) 
The basic question involved in construction of the 
articles of partnership is whether a provision that 
"assets" will be distributed 40-40-20 after winding up 
means that liabilities to partners need not be paid; for 
48-1-37 Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides that such 
liabilities will be paid, subject to "any agreement to the 
contrary." We submit that the trial court-in attempt-
ing to achieve what it may have deemed a "just" result 
-has overreached the sinews of reason, leaving con-
struction of statute and articles strained and sore. 
Other courts, in construing partnership agreements, 
have been reluctant to give one p~rtner's property to 
the others in the absence of some clear expression by 
the partners; and the only expression found in the pres-
ent agreement is a reference in one paragraph to dis-
tribution of "assets"-a term easily construed to mean 
net assets after the payment of liabilities, including 
liabilities to partners. 
It has long been recognized that partners' con-
tributions to the partnership should be repaid; a fortiori~ 
loans by partners to the partnership should be repaid. 
Two text-book cases dealing with partnerships and the 
nature of the partners' interests are Whitcomb v. Con-
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verse~ 119 Mass. 38, 20 Atl. 311 (1875) and Leserman 
v. Bernheimer~ 113 N.Y. 39, 20 N.E. 869 (1889). 
Whitcomb v. Converse was an action to compel 
contribution to make good the losses of a partnership 
which had been organized in 1871 to continue one year. 
The articles provided that Converse was to contribute 
$25,000.00, receive 7 per cent on it, give such time to the 
business as he was able, and receive 1)1 of the net profits; 
Whitcomb was to contribute $50,000.00, receive 7 per 
cent interest, give all his time, and take 1)1 of the net 
profits; Blagdon and Stanton were both to contribute 
all their time and receive 1)1 of the net profits each. 
Whitcomb put in $25,000.00 of the agreed $50,000.00. 
The partnership was dissolved by mutual consent and 
Whitcomb authorized to close up the business. He did 
so and claimed contribution because of a loss to the 
firm of $25,000.00. The court said: 
"* * * where, as is usual in an ordinary mer-
cantile partnership, a partnership is created not 
merely in profits and losses, but in the property 
itself, the property is transferred from the origi-
nal owners to the partnership, and becomes the 
joint property of the latter; a corresponding 
obligation arises on the part of the partnership 
to pay the value thereof to the individuals who 
originally contributed it; such payment cannot 
indeed by demanded during the continuance of 
the partnership, nor are the contributors, in the 
absence of agreement or usage, entitled to inter-
est, but if the assets of the partnership, upon a 
final settlement, are insufficient to satisfy this 
obligation, all the partners must bear it in the 
26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
same proportion as other debts of the partner-
ship. * * * 
"The partners were by agreement to receive 
each 1,4 of the net profits, and by implication of 
law must share the losses in the same proportion. 
The capital contributed became the property 
of the partnership; and the partnership, con-
sisting of all the partners, became liable to Whit-
comb and Converse respectively for the amount 
of capital paid in by them." 
Leserman v.Bernheimer was an action for settle-
ment of partnership accounts. In discussing the nature 
of the interests of the partners in the partnership prop-
erty the court said: 
"The interest of each partner in the partner-
ship property is his share in the surplus after 
the partnership accounts are settled and all just 
claims satisfied. In this case, by the terms of the 
partnership, the partners were to contribute 
equally, from the beginning of the partnership 
to its dissolution. There is no evidence which 
requires or would permit any finding that this 
arrangement had been changed, nor are we re-
ferred to such finding. It would seem to follow 
that the division of profits and charge of losses 
should be in the proportion of one-third of each 
to each partner. To carry out that mode of ad-
justment as the one provided by the agreement 
of the parties, the advances made by either part-
ner beyond the capital called for by that agree-
ment should be treated as a debt due from the 
firm~ paid out of the surplus before any division 
is made upon the partnership capital. If that 
advance was not in strictness to be regarded as 
a debt during the existence of the firm, nor until 
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the debts of the firm to third persons were satis-
fied, it came into that relation the moment those 
debts were paid, and the concern, as regards its 
businesss and its outside obligations wound up." 
(Emphasis added.) 
In l(aufer v. Rothman~ 4 N.J. Misc. 1029, 135 
Atl. 266 (1926), a bill for construction of a partnership 
agreement, the court rejected a contention that a pro-
vision for certain shares precluded prior repayment of 
capital. The agreement contained the following pro-
VISion: 
"At the expiration of one year period of the 
co-partnership, and in the event that it is mu-
tually decided to discontinue the partnership, 
the said Abraham A. Kaufer is to retain the 
aforesaid business, and said Abraham A. Kaufer 
is to pay to the said Jacob Rothman lj2 of the 
physical assets of the firm at the termination of 
the co-partnership.'' 
The court concluded that the agreement was predi-
cated upon the terms of the agreement that the partners 
were to make equal contributions to capital, holding 
that there should be an adjustment in the capital 
accounts resulting from the fact that Kaufer had 
contributed some $13,000.00 as against Rothman's 
$1,600.00. The court rejected, as being manifestly un-
just, a contention by Rothman that the agreement 
should be literally interpreted and that he should be 
able to take over the business by payment to Kaufer of 
1;2 of the assets without regard to adjustments to the 
capital accounts. 
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In Vallet v. Pechenik~ 380 Pa. 342, 110 A.2d 221 
( 1955) , one partner brought an action against the other 
partners for an accounting on dissolution. The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that a provision of the 
partnership agreement that one of the partners should 
receive, in addition to his salary of $15,000.00 per year, 
20 per cent of the annual net profits of the partnership, 
calculated annually after deduction of his base salary 
and the base salary of another partner, did not apply 
to profits made by the partnership on liquidation of 
partnership assets when the partnership was dissolved. 
The court held that he was to share in those "'profits" 
according to his capital acco~nt. 
Another case refusing to torture a partnership 
agreement into one requiring a contributing partner 
to give up his contribution is Glenn v. Weill et al.~ 319 
Pa. 380, 179 Atl. 563 ( 1935) . The accounting credited 
each partner with a 1/3 interest, but the trial court 
found this feature of the accounting to be improper 
and ordered distribution according to amounts con-
tributed. The partnership agreement contained nothing 
as to contributions to capital but the initial capital was 
carried on the books in certain amounts for each partner. 
The partner who had contributed nothing on the books 
averred that these were not contributions, but payments 
for an interest in the business. Both courts found this 
contention without merit. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court said: 
"Under these circumstances, the I/ 3 interest 
in the business mentioned in the agreement was 
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undoubtedly a 1/3 interest in the profits and 
losses, and in any surplus after paying off all 
the debts." 
After quoting the provisions of the Uniform J>art-
nership Act with respect to dissolution and distribution, 
the court went on: 
"* * * It necessarily follows that where, as 
here, the books of a partnership show an unequal 
contribution of capital and there is nothing in 
the partnership agreement to show the capital 
should not be returned in proportion to the 
amounts contributed, that return will be gov-
erned by the ordinary rule of law, which is, that 
the distribution of capital upon dissolution of 
a partnership is in the same proportion in which 
such capital was furnished." 
Adam v. Obarr_, 123 Cal. App. 36, 11 P.2d II 
(1932), was an appeal from a judgment dissolving 
a meat-and-grocery partnership, ordering an account-
ing, and directing the payment of debts, sale of assets, 
and distribution among the co-partners. The trial court 
determined that although the original agreement was 
for respondent's purchase from appellant of a lf2 inter-
est in the business, this had been changed by a later 
oral agreement to the effect that respondent should 
contribute to the partnership capital an amount equiva-
lent to the original investment of appellant. They found 
that he did so contribute in equal amounts. The appel-
late court held that the trial court had correctly ordered 
that after payment of the partnership debts and before 
distribution of the remaining assets the withdrawals 
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of the partner should be equalized by the payment to 
respondent of an amount equivalent to the excess with-
drawn by appellant. 
The court was wrong, too, insofar as it determined 
that the amounts paid into the partnership by Rulon 
were "capital contributions" as distinguished from 
"loans" and that there was no obligation to repay them. 
The presumption is that amounts contributed by Rulon 
not required by the partnership articles were loans. See 
M & C Creditors Corporation v. Pratt .. 281 N.Y. 804, 
24 N.E. 2d 482 (1939), a suit brought by an assignee 
of partnership assets and liabilities to recover part of 
the amount paid earlier to a deceased partner. The 
administrator of the deceased partner contended that 
the partner's interest represented a debt of the firm 
which, being fixed in amount, could not be affected by 
depreciation of the partnership assets. It was argued 
that upon the deceased partner's death the firm owed 
his estate more than $224,000.00 and that neither ap-
praisal nor liquidation was necessary to ascertain the 
amount of the claim. The court through Lehman, J., 
defined capital to consist of "money, required of the 
partners by partnership agreement," taking the view 
that sums voluntarily contributed for the use of the 
partnership over and above that amount represented 
an advance to the firm. The court said: 
"To the extent that the partnership agreement 
fails to impose an obligation on the partners to 
furnish capital requisite for the conduct of the 
business, the parties to the contract must intend 
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that money will be borrowed to carry on the busi-
ness and that interest will be paid on money bor-
rowed. Therefore, where a partner pays Inoney 
to the partnership beyond his partnership obli-
gation, it is a reasonable inference that the parties 
intended that such payment should be a loan 
and should bear interest. * * * 
"The items credited to Pratt's account [be-
tween partnership beginning and the death of 
the partner] may not arbitrarily be characterized 
as contributions to capital. They were not desig-
nated as such. It suggests itself that the other 
partners would have been required to make pro-
portiona~e contributions if they had regarded 
Pratt's advances as capital. It is conceded that 
no such payments were made." 
The court held that the money due to Pratt was a 
fixed debt and an obligation of the firm, and that Pratt's 
personal representatives were clearly entitled to the 
payments made to them. 
It would appear that all of the sums contributed 
by Rulon to the partnership after the date of the part-
nership, in the absence of some clear subsequent agree-
ment that sums would be added to capital, were loans 
to the partnership and were to be repaid before there 
could be a distribution of assets. This would be true 
regardless of the treatment to be given to beginning 
capital. 
The above cases, the partnership act, and the pro-
visions of the partnership agreement all militate against 
the construction of the trial court. Moreover, the par-
ties themselves, prior to initiation of the present action, 
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construed the agreement as providing for a return 
of capital to Rulon. A contemporaneous construction 
is found in the manner in which accountant Terry 
showed the capital accounts on partnership books until 
after dissolution. It is also found in the provisions of 
the dissolution agreement (hereinafter discussed), and 
in the scurrying of Terry's counsel to obtain an agree-
ment on April 2, 1960, that Terry and Flora would 
not be charged with any losses. This certainly would 
not have been necessary if the trial court's construction 
was correct, for the losses were to be borne by whom-
ever contributed the most capital. 
(c) Respondents are bound by the dissolution 
agreement of A.pril 2, 1960, which required payment 
of liabilities to partners on winding up of partnership 
affairs. 
The respondents in their answers to the complaint, 
in the counterclaim of Terry, and in the answers to oral 
interrogatories, have relied upon the dissolution agree-
ment and supplemental agreement of April 2, 1960, as 
creating some interest in them. Their contentions are 
inconsistent in some respects: Flora says both that she 
received the interest at the time of the articles of part-
nership and on April 2, 1960, while Terry has generally 
taken the position that he received 40 per cent of Rulon 
by virtue of the dissolution agreement. This contention 
is reflected in the book entry referred to in the statement 
of facts, charging about $90,000.00 against Rulon's 
capital account on the basis of the agreement of April 
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2, 1960. Regardless of Rulon's original contention as 
to the binding effect of the agreements of April :l, 
1960, the agreements ought to be binding upon the 
defendants, either as an aid to construction of the part-
nership or as operative agreements themselves. Terry 
has pleaded the agreements and Flora, in her answer, 
has stated that she fully ratified, accepted, and con-
firmed them. 
Paragraph 1 of the dissolution agreement pro-
vides: 
"The winding up of the partnership affairs 
shall consist of selling all real and personal prop-
erty of the partnership, paying all partnership 
liabilities (including liabilities to partners) J and 
distributing the net assets of the partnership in 
cash to the parties hereto in the following pro-
portion: 
Rulon R. West 407o 
Terry R. West 407o 
Flora E. West 207o 
"When all the net assets of the partnership 
have been distributed in cash in accordance with 
the preceding sentence, the winding up of the 
partnership affairs shall be completed." (Em-
phasis added.) 
"Liabilities to partners" is clear enough. In sub-
paragraph (2) of 48-1-37 Utah Code Annotated 1953 
there is a reference to three classes of liabilities to part-
ners: those owing other than for capital and profits, 
those owing in respect of capital, and those owing in 
respect of profits. There is no reason to suppose that 
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the parties meant to adopt a different meaning for 
"liabilities to partners," and under the terms of the 
dissolution agreement it was incumbent upon the court 
to order payment of liabilities to partners prior to dis-
tribution of the remaining assets. 
(d) Neither the articles of partnership nor the 
supplemental agreement of April 2, 1960, operates as 
a gift to the respondents of appellant's property. 
The trial court must have asked itself this question: 
What kind of businessman of ordinary acumen would 
enter into a contract by the terms of which 607o of all 
his contributions to a partnership would, ipso facto, 
vest in his co-partners (neither of whom had any sub-
stantial funds to contribute themselves) ? And given 
itself this answer: King Lear or Santa Claus. For the 
court seemed reluctant to interpret the partnership 
contract, qua contract, as accomplishing what the sum-
mary judgment accomplished. Prior to entering the 
judgment the court said (R. 106): 
"All right, then, gentlemen, my order will be 
that the contract be construed that as of the sec-
ond day of April, 1960, both of the Messrs. West 
have a 40 per cent interest, Terry by way of a 
gift, and that Flora has a 20 per cent interest 
by way of a gift, and that the distribution of the 
assets after the payment of debts to outsiders be 
on this basis." 
The court did not make it clear what it relied upon 
as constituting the "gift" of the 40 per cent interest to 
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Terry and the 20 per cent interest to Flora, but it must 
have been either the partnership agreement or the 
supplemental agreement of April 2, 1960. We sub1nit 
that neither satisfies the requirements of a valid inter 
vivos gift. 
The courts have consistently affirmed that a valid 
gift requires an "unmistakable intention" of the donor 
to make a gift, coupled with such delivery as the nature 
of the property permits. 24 Am. Jur., Gifts, §§ 21-27. 
There are no enforceable promises to make gifts. Id., 
§ 23. 
In Holman v. Deseret Savings Bank et al.~ 41 Utah 
340, 124 Pac. 765 (1912), the court had the following 
to say about the requisites of an inter vivos gift: 
"Gifts inter vivos have no reference to the 
future, and go into the immediate and absolute 
effect. To constitute such a gift, the donor must 
be divested of, and the donee invested with, the 
right of property in the subject of the gift. It 
must be absolute, irrevocable, without any refer-
ence to its taking place at some future period. 
The donor must deliver the property in part with 
all present and future dominion over it." 
And in Christensen v. Ogden State Bank~ 75 Utah 
478, 286 Pac. 638 ( 1930), this court again recognized 
that there can be no "executory gift." 
At the time of execution of the articles the capital 
of the partnership consisted of an equity in a real estate 
contract and $1,000 cash, both contributed by Rulon. 
Assuming that the articles could be taken (without 
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regard to surrounding disputed facts) to show an "un .. 
mistakable intention" to make a gift, what was or could 
have been given? An interest in beginning capital? An 
interest in any amounts thereafter contributed or loaned 
by Rulon? Or would the rights of respondents in sub-
sequent payments depend upon the intent existing at 
the time property or money was delivered? And if a 
later intent were important, could it have been deter-
mined as a matter of law? 
The articles of partnership should not have been 
interpreted as making any gift, and could not be inter-
preted as making a gift of amounts to be paid in by 
Rulon in the future - which amounts weren't even 
promised. 
Moreover, the evidence is shadowy as to whether 
there was any gift when the articles were signed. Flora 
says both that there was and wasn't. Terry claimed a 
gift only in the dissolution agreement and supplement, a 
fact borne out by his accounting treatment of capital, and 
his post-dissolution "adjustment" of Rulon's capital 
account by transfer of approximately $90,000.00 to 
himself and Flora. 
But the transactions of April 2, 1960, cannot be 
held to constitute a gift, for there was neither "unmis-
takable intention" nor delivery. Indeed, the supple-
mental agreement doesn't even identify the property 
that has been or is being given, and is phrased in terms 
of a bargain for consideration. 
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The supplemental agreement that Terry's attorney 
prevailed upon Rulon to sign is entitled "Agreement," 
and describes itself as being a "supplemental" to the 
Dissolution Agreement then being negotiated. It states 
that the parties have "mutually agreed" as to certain 
matters. In paragraph I, without showing what "40 
per cent" is being talked about, the agreement provides 
that Rulon "agrees" that the contribution with respect 
to "the " 40 per cent interest acquired by Terry West 
was and is a gift, and that Rulon will (prospectively) 
file a gift tax return. In paragraph 2, he agrees to 
absorb all losses suffered by the partnership. And in 
paragraph 3, Rulon "certifies" that "the" interest 
acquired by Flora was also by virtue of a gift. We 
submit that the supplemental agreement does not 
qualify as a binding agreement upon Rulon because 
not given for consideration. It is not capable of con-
struction contended for by respondents because such 
a construction is repugnant to plain language of the 
agreement supplemented, and the language of the 
agreement can be construed so as not to create such 
inconsistenecy. The supplemental agreement appears 
to be an attempt on the part of Terry to obtain an 
unjustifiable tax benefit in event there were a surplus. 
(If the trial court was relying on the supplemental 
agreement, it did give Rulon one advantage. To be 
consistent with its application of 40-40-20, it should 
have required Rulon to pay into the partnership an 
amount necessary to increase the capital-if there had 
been a loss-to the greatest amount he had contributed. 
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Otherwise, respondents might not receive their full 
60<j'o.) 
The supplemental agreement does not purport to 
be a deed of gift and contains no word of assignment 
or transfer, failing to identify the property "trans-
ferred." At most, it is an agreement as to the method 
of treatment to be given to a transaction concluded in 
the past (or contemporaneously with the supplemental 
agreement) . It· is inconceivable how the trial court 
could have construed the supplemental agreement as a 
gift of 60 per cent of Rulon's interest in the partner-
ship-not only 60 per cent of the original contribution 
made in 1957, but 60 per cent of all contributions made 
thereafter, and 60 per cent of all loans made to the 
partnership, as well as 60 per cent of all of the interest 
to which he was entitled, and 60 per cent of all indis-
tributed profits. 
In Jones et al v. Cook~ 118 Utah 562, 223 P.2d 
423 ( 1950) , this court adopted the view that there must 
be a "clear and unmistakable intention" on the part 
of the donor to make a gift, and that the gift must be 
proved by clear and convincing evidence. The donee 
has the burden of proving the gift. Blonde v. Jenkins~ 
Estate~ 130 Cal. App.2d 682, 281 P.2d 14 (1955). 
We submit that on the basis of evidence found in 
the depositions and answers to interrogatories, and the 
statements in the pleadings, a finding of a gift by Rulon 
to Flora and Terry of 60 per cent of his interest in the 
partnership "would lack the support of clear and con-
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vincing evidence." lVIoreover, in this case the court 
never arrived at fact-finding stage. It determined as 
a matter of law that there are no facts in dispute which 
could have a bearing upon whether a gift had been, or 
upon the extent of that gift. 
We recognize that the kind of property involved 
in a partnership may not admit of actual delivery. But 
it does admit of a less equivocal delivery than had found 
sufficient by the trial court. The kinds of delivery 
necessary to constitute a valid gift of a debt to the 
debtor (essentially our situation) are discussed at length 
in the annotation, "Gift of Debt to Debtor," beginning 
at 63 A.L.R.2d 259. Most enlightening are the cases 
on page 472 dealing with gifts of partnership interests, 
where the courts have looked for delivery in some un-
ambiguous action with respect to the partnership books. 
In the present case there has been no assignment, 
and no direction on the part of the claimed donor to 
make book entries to reflect the "gift." The book entry 
made by Terry was his own idea, made two or more 
months after the April 2 agreement, without Rulon's 
knowledge. 
II 
The court erred in withholding from the specia; 
master determination of the capital accounts of the 
partners and the interest due on capital invested in and 
loans made to the partnership. 
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At the time of appointment of the special master 
an order was prepared and submitted to the court which 
would have required the master to determine the state 
of the capital accounts and arrive at a determination 
of the interest due to Rulon R. West on the amounts 
that were standing in his capital account. The provision 
for this determination was stricken by the trial court 
(R. 146), after which the plaintiff moved that the order 
be amended to provide for a determination of capital 
contributions and interest (R. 148), but the motion was 
denied. 
Insofar as the order related to a determination of 
capital contributions for the purpose of distribution 
on a 40-40-20 basis, the action of the court was con-
sistent with its interlocultory summary judgment. But 
the summary judgment did not purport to make a 
determination of the interest on contributions to which 
any of the parties was entitled under the plain terms 
of the partnership agreement. 
It does not require extensive discussion to show the 
error of the court in this respect. The partnership 
articles were clear on interest. We need refer only to 
paragraph 4: 
"Interest at the rate of five per cent ( 5lfo) 
per annum shall be paid to each partner on the 
capital for the time being standing to his credit 
out of the gross profits of the business, and such 
interest shall be cumulative, so that any defi-
ciency in one year shall be made up out of the 
gross profits of any succeeding year or years." 
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CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff should have had judgment as a matter 
of law that he was entitled to a return of his contri-
butions, interest on them, and loans to the partnership 
prior to a distribution of the remaining P,artnership 
assets. The partnership articles, if read in their entirety, 
lead inescapably to the conclusion that the contributions 
of partners were to be treated as contributions are 
treated in other partnerships-that is, they were to be 
repaid. 
A construction that the partnership articles con-
templated a return of capital is buttressed by the con-
temporaneous construction of the parties. It is un-
disputed that Terry West, the accountant, kept the 
partnership books in such a manner as to show a 
capital account for Rulon, and that he placed into the 
capital account various amounts contributed or lent 
to the partnership by Rulon. On about April 2, 1960, 
when the parties negotiated and signed a dissolution 
agreement (later ratified by Flora) it was expressly 
provided that the liabilities to partners would be paid 
before the net assets were distributed in the proportions 
of 40-40-20. As an adjunct to this dissolution agree-
ment there was a supplemental agreement which, pos-
sibly, was interpreted by the trial court as a "gift" of 
something or other. But the supplemental agreement 
deals only with the method of treating something which 
it is assumed the other parties already had received. 
Patently, it is directed at a tax savings for Terry. It 
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refers only to "the" 40 per cent interest without setting 
out what it is 40 per cent of. The parties must have 
assumed that the extent of those interests were deter-
minable by reference to other documents. The only 
other documents are the articles of partnership and 
the dissolution agreement, both of which must be con-
strued as providing for a return of capital, for a pay-
ment by the partnership of liabilities to partners prior 
to distribution of assets. 
But not only did the trial court refuse to enter a 
summary judgment in the plaintiff's behalf (which 
judgment was plainly dictated by the terms of the in-
struments before the trial court and by the testimony 
and admissions of the respondents) it violated rules of 
reason and right to trial by holding, as a matter of law, 
that appellant had lost 60 per cent of his property. 
Whether he contributed it as capital, or loaned it, or 
whether Terry had (as contended by Rulon) promised 
to execute notes in behalf of the partnership as evidence 
of the loans made by Rulon, made no difference to 
the trial court. The trial court not only took away from 
Rulon and gave to respondents the money he contributed 
as capit~l and loaned to the partnership, but excised 
from the partnership agreement the provision as to 
payment of interest, and held, in effect, that Rulon 
would be entitled to profits from operations of the 
partnership only if he succeeded in getting them away 
from Terry prior to dissolution. 
It is submitted that if the plaintiff is not entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law at least there are fact 
43 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
issues concerning the purposes for which money was 
advanced to the partnership after the date of the articles 
of partnership, the meaning and effect of the agree-
ments of April2, 1960, and the question of whether the 
supplemental agreement was to be conditional upon 
the respondent Terry West making a satisfactory 
arrangement with Rulon West to pay for his remaining 
interest in the partnership. The case, to that extent, has 
issues of fact which should be tried. The court committed 
plain error in ruling in the summary judgment that 
the plaintiff was not entitled to return of his contribu-
tions, loans, interest, and undistributed profit, and in 
construing a completely ambiguous and equivocal 
"supplemental agreement" to constitute a gift-a con-
struction repugnant to the dissolution agreement to 
which it was supplemental, and to the articles of partner-
ship theretofore executed by the parties. 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed 
and a decree entered directing that the receiver repay 
to Rulon R. West his capital contributions, loans, in-
terest, and undistributed profits before making any 
distribution of the net assets of the partnership. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City I, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
-Appellant 
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APPENDIX "A" 
ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP 
This AGREEMENT, made and entered into as of the 15th day 
of October, A.D. 1957, by RULON R. WEST, TERRY R. WEST 
and FLORA E. WEST,-WITNESSETH: 
That the above named parties have associated themselves as 
partners under the firm name of EL RANCHO ENTERPRISES for 
the purposes and on the conditions herein recited: 
1. The partnership business shall be that of operating motels, 
auto camps, trailer camps, tourist camps and allied businesses and 
shall be carried on at 5203 South State Street, in Murray City, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, or at such other place or places as the 
partners may from time to time agree upon. 
2. Said partnership shall continue until dissolved by the mutual 
consent of the partners or terminated by operation of law. 
3. The capital of the partnership shall consist of the following 
property: 
(a) A real estate contract covering the purchase by the partner-
ship and the sale by Reed P. Mortensen and Ann S. Mortensen, 
his wife, of the Murray El Rancho Motel, including approximately 
four ( 4) acres of real property situated at 5203 South State Street, 
in Murray City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, including the per-
sonal property located in the sixteen motel units situated upon said 
real property upon which contract the said Rulon R. West has paid 
the sum of $47,500.00 and the sum of $1,000.00 cash in bank account 
also furnisped by the said Rulon R. West. 
(b) Any further sums which any partner shall with the con-
sent of the other from time to time contribute for capital purposes 
which shall be credited to his capital account. 
4. Interest at the rate of five per cent ( 5%) per annum shall be 
paid to each partner on the capital for the time being standing to his 
credit out of the gross profits of the business, and such interest shall 
be cumulative, so that any deficiency in one year shall be made up out 
of the gross profits of any succeeding year or years. 
5. The said Terry R. West shall be the Manager of the partner-
ship business and shall be entitled to draw up to but not exceeding 
the sum of $500.00 per month for his services, all amounts so drawn 
t? be charged as a partnership expense and deducted before any divi-
ston of net profits is made. 
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6. The net profits of the business shall be divided between the 
partners in the following proportions: Rulon R. West, forty per cent 
( 40%); Terry R. West, forty per cent ( 40%) and Flora E. West 
twenty per cent (20%); and the partners shall in like proportion 
bear all losses, including loss of capital. 
7. The usual books of account shall be kept properly posted up, 
and shall not be removed from the place of business without the 
consent of all partners. Each partner shall have free access to them 
at all times, and shall be at liberty to make such extracts therefrom 
as he may think fit. 
8. On the 15th day of October, A.D. 1958 and on the 15th 
day of October in each succeeding year during the continuation of the 
partnership, an account shall be taken of all the capital, assets and 
liabilities for the time being of the partnership, and a balance sheet 
and profit and loss account making due allowance for depreciation and 
for recouping any lost capital shall be prepared and a copy thereof 
furnished to each partner. At any time agreed upon by all of the 
partners, after the preparation of the said balance sheet and profit and 
loss account, the net profits, if any, shown by such account may be 
divided in the proportions set forth in paragraph 6 above hereof. 
9. The partners agree: (a) That Terry R. West shall diligently 
attend to the business and devote such portion of his time thereto as 
is necessary to properly and economically operate said business. (b) 
each partner shall punctually pay his separate debts and indemnify 
the other partners and the assets of the partnership against the same 
and all expenses on account thereof; (c) each partner shall forthwith 
pay all moneys, checks, and negotiable instruments received by him on 
account of the firm into the bank or banks selected by the partners to the 
firm account; (d) each partner shall be just and faithful to the other 
partners, and at all times give to such other partners full information 
and truthful explanations of all matters relating to the affairs of the 
partnership, and afford every assistance in his power in carrying on 
the business for their mutual advantage. 
10. No partner shall without the consent of the others (a) Lend 
any of the moneys or deliver upon credit any of the goods of the firm 
to any person or persons whom the other partners shall have previously 
in writing forbidden him to trust; (b) Give any security or promise 
for the payment of money on account of the firm unless in the ordinary 
course of business; (c) enter into any bond, or become bail, indorser, 
or surety for any person, or knowingly cause or suffer to be done 
anything whereby the partnership property may be seized, attached, 
or taken on execution or endangered; (d) assign, mortgage, or charge 
his share in the assets or profits of the partnership, or any part of such 
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share; (e) draw, accept, or indorse any bill of exchange or promissory 
note on account of the firm; (f) sign any checkon behalf of the firm 
for a sum exceeding $500.00; (g) buy, order, or contract for any 
goods or property exceeding the value of $500.00 on behalf of the 
partnership; (h) cot?promise, or compound, or, except up~n payment 
in full, release or dtscharge any debt due to the partnershtp. 
11. If any partner shall die during the continuance of the said 
partnership, the survivors or survivor may purchase the share of the 
deceased partner in the capital and assets of the business on the fol-
lowing terms: (a) The purchase price shall be the amount at which 
such share shall stand in the last balance sheet which shall have been 
prepared prior to the death of said partner plus ten per cent (10%) 
thereof; (b) such purchase of any deceased partner's interest, if made 
by the surviving partners or partner, shall be effected within one year 
from the date of death, and in addition to the purchase money, the 
surviving partners or partner shall pay a sum equal to interest on the 
amount of said purchase price computed from the date of the then 
last preceding annual account up to the date of death of the deceased 
at the rate of 5% per annum in lieu both of interest on capital, in-
cluding any arrears of such interest for preceding years, and profits 
during such period, credit being given for any sums drawn out by the 
deceased partner during the then current year. 
12. If the surviving partners or partner shall not exercise the 
option of purchasing the share and interest of the deceased partner, 
or if the partnership shall be determined or expire during the joint 
lives of the partners, then the partnership shall be wound up, and the 
assets distributed in the proportions set forth in paragraph 6 above 
hereof. 
13. All rents, taxes, costs of repairs, alterations, or improve-
ments, insurance and all other costs, charges and expenses which shall 
be incurred in or about the business or in any wise relating thereto, 
and all losses which shall happen in respect to the business, shall be 
paid out of the income or capital of the partnership, and in case of 
any deficiency thereof by the partners in the proportions set forth in 
paragraph 6 above hereof. 
14. Notwithstanding the death of any partner, the partnership 
between the surviving partners shall continue under these articles 
of partnership. 
15. At the end or sooner determination of the partnership the 
partners, each to the other, shall make a true, just and final account 
of all things relating to their said business, and in all things adjust 
the same; and all stock, as well as the gains and increases thereof, 
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including all real and personal property, which shall appear to be 
remaining, either in money, goods, wares, fixtures, debts or otherwise, 
shall be divided between them in the proportions set forth in paragraph 
6 above hereof. 
16. Any decisions and major arrangements required or necessary 
in the operation of said business which are not in the ordinary course 
of operations shall only be made and effected by and with the unani-
mous agreement and consent of all the partners. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the partners above named have here-
unto set their hands and seals the day and year first above written. 
Is /Rulon R. West 
jsj Terry R. West 
jsj Flora West 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 55 
On the 1st day of October, A.D. 1957 personally appeared before 
me the said Rulon R. West, Terry R. West and Flora E. West, signers 
of the above instrument, who duly severally acknowledged to me that 
they executed the same. 
(Seal) 
My Commission Expires: 
Sept. 10, 1959 
Paul S. Roberts 
Notary Public 
Residing at Murray City, Utah 
APPENDIX "B" 
AGREEMENT 
AGREEMENT made this ·--- day of ----------------------------, 1960, by 
and between RULON R. WEST, FLORA E. WEST, and TERRY R. 
WEST. 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto are partners under those certain 
Articles of Partnership dated the 15th day of October, 1957, and 
WHEREAS, said partnership has been and is hereby declared 
to be dissolved, and 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to make an agreement with 
respect to certain matters pertaining to the winding up of the partner-
ship affairs, 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree that Rulon R. 
West and Terry R. West shall have authority to wind up the partner· 
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ship affairs, shall concur in all matters pertaining to the winding up 
of the partnership affairs, and shall proceed to wind up the partnership 
affairs in accordance with the following provisions: 
1. Elements and Completion of Winding Up. The winding up 
of the partnership affairs shall consist of selling all real and personal 
property of the partnership, paying all partnership liabilities ( includ-
ing liabilities to partners) , and distributing the net assets of the 
partnership in cash to the parties hereto in the following proportions: 
Rulon R. West 40% 
Terry R. West 40% 
Flora E. West 20% 
When all the net assets of the partnership have been distributed in 
cash in accordance with the preceding sentence, the winding up of the 
partnership affairs shall be completed . 
. 2. Operation of Partnership Business Pending Sale. Each busi-
ness of the partnership shall be operated until such time as such busi-
ness is sold. Rulon R. West and Terry R. West and Flora West shall 
concur in all management decisions pertaining to the operation of 
said businesses. Terry R. West shall diligently attend to the business 
in the daily operation of the businesses, which operation shall include 
the renting of accommodations, the maintenance of all partnership 
property, including the interior and exterior of all buildings, rental 
units, signs, fences, sidewalks, driveways and other real and personal 
property of the partnership, in good· repair, working order and appear-
ance, and the maintenance of the motel and trailer camp premises, 
including the lawn, shrubbery and trees, in a state of good, neat and 
attractive appearance, having such assistance as is reasonably necessary 
to accomplish same. Terry R. West shall receive reasonable and periodic 
compensation for his services pertaining to the daily operation of the 
businesses, which compensation shall be on the same basis as here-
tofore taken and no additional compensation unless said compensation 
is agreed upon from [time} to time by all of the parties hereto. 
3. Receipts and Disbursements. All receipts obtained from opera-
tions of the motel, trailer sales, and trailer park shall be deposited 
in the usual account and checked out only for payment of employees 
salaries, utilities, and ordinary expenses, including expenses to Terry 
R. West as above specified. All receipts involving sales of capital 
assets or realization from trailer sales where equities aside from the 
obligation and any other capital assets sales shall be placed in a special 
bank account, from which no proceeds can be taken except over the 
signatures of Terry R. West and Rulon R. West, or instead of Rulon 
R. West, Leroy E. Holmes. 
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4. Sale of Partnership Property. All partnership property, includ-
ing the good will, shall be sold as soon and for a price as near to the 
fair market value thereof as is reasonably possible under the circum-
stances. Any offer for the purchase of any part or all of the partnership 
property which is made by a reasonably dependable and solvent 
offeror, on reasonable terms and for a reasonable amount shall be 
accepted. No property shall be accepted in trade as either part or 
full payment for the purchase of part or all of the partnership property 
unless such property can be expected to be sold with reasonable prompt-
ness at a price equal or in excess of the value for which it was accepted 
in trade. The sale of the partnership property shall be advertised in a 
reasonable manner, consistent with the desires to make a sale with 
reasonable promptness and to attract the attention of as many as 
possible of those persons who would and could qualify as purchasers. 
5. Distribution of Partnership Assets. The parties hereto shall 
determine from time to time during the period of the winding up of 
the partnership affairs the amount of the partnership assets which 
may be distributed to the parties hereto in cash in the proportions 
specified in Paragraph 1 hereof, taking into consideration the absolute 
and contingent liabilities of the partnership. 
6. Statements. On or before the 3rd day of April, 1960, and each 
six ( 6) months therafter until the winding up of the partnership 
affairs is completed, Terry R. West shall prepare and shall distribute 
to each of the parties hereto an accurate, detailed and complete state-
ment of all partnership assets, liabilities, receipts and disbursements. 
The partnership books shall be kept current by Terry R. West. Each 
of the parties hereto shall have access to the partnership books at any 
reasonable time. 
7. Authority of Leroy E. Holmes. At all times during which 
Rulon R. West is away from Salt Lake City, Utah, during the period 
of the winding up of the partnership affairs, Leroy E. Holmes, of 
1381 Brookshire Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, shall, so long as he is 
in possession of a written and effective power of attorney from Rulon 
R. West, have the right to act for and in behalf of Rulon R. West 
in all matters pertaining to the winding up of the partnership affairs, 
and shall have all the rights, powers and privileges which Rulon R. 
West has under this agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto sub· 
scribed their names the day and year first above written. 
/ s /Rulon R. West 
/s/ Flora West 
/s/ Terry R. West 
X 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 55 
On the 31st day of March, 1960, personally appeared before me 
RULON R. WEST, one of the signers of the within and foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
My commission expires: 
April 9, 1961 
Jane Roberts 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah 
APPENDIX "C" 
AGREEMENT 
This supplemental agreement to the dissolution agreement made 
and entered into the 2nd day of April, 1960, wherein it is mutually 
agreed as follows: 
1. The contribution made by Rulon R. West with respect to the 
40 per cent interest acquired by Terry R. West was and is a gift from 
Rulon R. West to Terry R. West, and Rulon R. West does agree to 
file a gift tax return in connection therewith so stating. 
2. Should the motel or the businesses be sold at a loss wherein 
the net recoveries are less than the sums due thereon, all loss will be 
absorbed and paid by Rulon R. West. 
3. The undersigned, Rulon R. West, further certifies that the 
interest in the El Rancho Enterprises was not only a gift to Terry 
R. West, but also to Flora West and their interests were acquired by 
virtue of the gift. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 2nd day of April, 1960. 
Is /Rulon R. West 
jsj Terry R. West 
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